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Reforming the Law of Rape
Stephen J. Schulhofer†
Introduction
The topic of contemporary rape-law reform holds a natural
point of interest for this Symposium convened to celebrate the
thirty-fifth anniversary of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory
and Practice, and in particular because of its commitment to
paying tribute to its founding faculty sponsor, Catharine A.
MacKinnon. I congratulate the Journal’s editors on their very
fitting decision to honor Professor MacKinnon, whose work over
the past thirty-five years has been a major force for progress in
affording women equal opportunity and protecting them from
violence, in this country and around the world.
In this Article, I undertake two distinct tasks. First, I want
to discuss what the laws against sexual assault ideally should look
like. But second, I also want to discuss rape law from the
perspective of someone who has spent the past four years in the
messy and frustrating work of legislative compromise, trying to
design law reform that can be both progressive and enactable.
There is an obvious contradiction in that regard. The goal is to
pass reforms that move society and our criminal justice system in
a progressive direction, to the place where society ought to be. But
that means, by definition, getting broad agreement on principles
about which people do not agree—at least not yet.
Before I turn to that second part of the story, this Article
addresses three points. First, it sketches the traditional twentieth
†. Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York University; Reporter,
American Law Institute Project to Revise Article 213 of the Model Penal Code. I
am exceptionally grateful to Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon for stimulating my
interest in these issues several decades ago and for incisively challenging my
current and prior efforts in this area over the many years we have been colleagues.
I have especially appreciated the inspiration she has afforded me in matters where
we agreed and the unfailing courtesy and respect she has extended to me in
matters where we did not. My understanding of the issues addressed here has also
benefited from advice, consultation, and extensive conversation with individuals
far too numerous to name—the many judges, academics, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and other lawyers who have made important contributions to the
American Law Institute project. I cannot fail to mention the special thanks I owe,
for contributions far beyond the ordinary, to my energetic and insightful
collaborator and Model Penal Code co-Reporter Erin Murphy. The views expressed
in this Article are exclusively my own.
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century law of rape (still in force in some jurisdictions!) and
outlines the reforms that were emphasized in the 1960s and
1970s, before Professor MacKinnon’s impact was felt. Second, it
describes the distinct perspective that Professor MacKinnon
brought to these debates and how it helped shaped the reforms
that followed. Third, this Article offers an outline of where we are
now, the progress we’ve made, and some of the problems that still
need to be addressed.
This Article then turns to the second large part of the rape
reform story and discusses the work of getting progressive reform
enacted in the face of strong and determined resistance. Part of
that resistance is outright misogyny—unconscious or overt
disrespect for women. Although it is important to acknowledge
that fact, this Article will focus instead on resistance that is not
attributable to misogyny. It can be hard to see that resistance
sometimes reflects legitimate concerns which those of us
committed to reform must understand and address.
I. Traditional Rape Law and the First Wave of Reform
(1960–1980)
In the eighteenth century, Blackstone defined rape as
“[c]arnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”1
Courts were obsessed with the idea that a woman might fabricate
a rape accusation, so there were unique obstacles to conviction:
requirements of prompt complaint and corroboration,2 including
corroboration of unwillingness by proof that the victim had
resisted to the utmost.3 Those requirements are now largely
obsolete,4 but Blackstone’s core concepts—force and non-consent—
are now the focus of intense debate and disagreement.
1. 4 W ILLIAM B LACKSTONE , C OMMENTARIES ON THE L AWS OF E NGLAND 210
(Chicago Press ed. 1979) (1765–1769).
2. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Michelle J.
Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L.
R EV . 945, 947–48 (2004).
3. See S TEPHEN J. S CHULHOFER , U NWANTED S EX 20 (1998) (“The code
preserved the rules requiring a prompt complaint, corroboration of the victim’s
testimony, and special cautionary instructions to the jury”).
4. Only one state, South Carolina, maintains a prompt complaint
requirement, and that rule applies only in cases arising between spouses. Thirteen
states retain limited corroboration requirements, and these have been narrowly
restricted by judicial interpretation. See M ODEL P ENAL C ODE : S EXUAL A SSAULT
AND R ELATED O FFENSES 185–87 (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 8,
2015) [hereinafter M ODEL P ENAL C ODE , Preliminary Draft No. 5).
This
“Preliminary Draft” is part of an ongoing American Law Institute (ALI) project to
revise the sexual assault provisions of the Model Penal Code. It has not been
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In the 1960s, the reformers who wrote the Model Penal Code
(MPC) expanded Blackstone’s narrow concept of force, so that it
could include nonviolent duress, like a threat to fire someone from
a job or to take away custody of their children, in cases where such
a threat could prevent resistance by “[a] woman of ordinary
resolution.”5 States that generally followed the MPC in other
respects, however, were not ready to accept its cautious extension
of the law of sexual assault; they continued to define rape as a
crime of physical violence.6
In the 1970s, there was another wave of reform. Strong
feminist organizations and rape-survivor advocacy groups joined
with the general tough-on-crime movement that became powerful
in the 1970s.7 Politically, the reformers were almost unstoppable.
Yet what stands out, in light of Professor MacKinnon’s subsequent
work, is how modest the 1970s reforms were. The top priority was
to eliminate procedural obstacles and protect victims from abusive
cross-examination in the courtroom,8 and those goals were almost
entirely successful, at least in the laws on the books.9
A 1975 Michigan statute was probably the most ambitious
reform of its time.10 It enacted almost the entire victim-advocate’s
wish list.11 For example, the statute repealed the resistance
requirement and eliminated all reference to consent, because a
non-consent requirement seemed to put the victim on trial and
divert attention from the defendant’s misconduct.12 But from
today’s perspective, what is striking is that the Michigan statute
still required proof of physical force or threats of physical
violence.13 Flagrant coercion still fell outside the reach of criminal
law.
In a 1983 case, an Illinois man accosted a woman on an
isolated bike path.14 He was almost twice her size, and after they
talked for a few minutes, he picked her up, carried her into the
formally approved by the ALI, and therefore does not represent its official position
on any of matters covered.
5. M ODEL P ENAL C ODE § 213.1 (2)(a) (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
6. See S CHULHOFER , supra note 3, at 1–10, 23–25.
7. Id. at 29–31.
8. Id. at 31, 33.
9. See e.g., M ICH . C OMP . L AWS §§ 750.520h–750.520k (2014); see also M ODEL
P ENAL C ODE & C OMMENTARIES , P ART II § 213.1 (AM. LAW. INST.1980).
10. See S CHULHOFER , supra note 3, at 35–37.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 31, 33.
13. See id.
14. People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983).
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woods, and performed several sex acts.15 She was terrified, but
because she never cried out or protested, the court reversed the
rape conviction.16
In a 1985 case, a foster parent threatened to send the
fourteen-year-old girl who was in his care back to a detention
facility if she did not submit to sex.17 The court upheld a
conviction for corrupting the morals of a minor but reversed the
rape conviction because the foster parent had not threatened the
girl with physical force.18
In a 1990 case, a Montana high school principal threatened to
prevent a student from graduating unless she had sex with him.19
The court held that the principal could not be guilty of rape for the
same reason—he had not threatened her with physical force.20
That is where things stood when Professor MacKinnon
addressed rape in a powerful 1983 article21 and, of course, in her
1989 book Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.22 By then a few
courts were willing to say that coercive circumstances could
sometimes be sufficient.23 But these were halting steps. Even the
most progressive courts were requiring some implicit danger of
physical harm, for example, when an armed police officer
implicitly threatens the victim with arrest.24 Nearly all courts
were still asking whether the defendant’s conduct was essentially
equivalent to physical violence.25
II. MacKinnon’s Contribution
What Professor MacKinnon’s work showed was that “force”
has many faces, that the absence of physical force does not
necessarily enable women to control, as she vividly put it, “what is
done to them.” Rape law could not justifiably assume that ability
15. Id.
16. Id. at 593.
17. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), aff’d
by equally divided court, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
18. Id. at 404.
19. State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1103–04 (Mont. 1990).
20. Id. at 1107.
21. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 S IGNS 635 (1983).
22. C ATHARINE A. M AC K INNON , T OWARD A F EMINIST T HEORY OF THE S TATE
(1989).
23. E.g., State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 735–36 (R.I. 1987) (finding that a police
officer who demanded a hitchhiker perform oral sex on him had implicitly
threatened the hitchhiker with violence if she did not comply).
24. Id. at 737.
25. See id. at 737–38.
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to control because, under conditions of gender inequality, social
constraints and pervasive disparities of power can be decisive.26
MacKinnon’s work laid bare the ways that women sometimes have
no alternative except to acquiesce. As she wrote in Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State:
[A]cceptable sex, in the legal perspective, can entail a
lot of force . . . . The adjudicated line [distinguishing
rape from sex in specific cases] . . . commonly centers on
some assessment of the woman’s will . . . [but] the
deeper problem is that women . . . may have or perceive
no alternative . . . [except to] submit to survive.
Absence of [physical] force does not ensure the presence
of that control [over what is done to them].27
In other words, force runs on a continuum—the knife at your
throat, the threat to throw you in jail, the threat to take away your
job or your children, the need to placate a thesis supervisor—all
these things can lead a person to tolerate and submit to unwanted
sexual advances.28
In the 1980s, a few courts finally started to understand this.
For example, a Pennsylvania judge defined force as “[c]ompulsion
by physical, moral, or intellectual means or by the exigencies of
the circumstances.”29
Another court recognized that force
“[i]ncludes ‘not only physical force or violence, but also moral,
psychological or intellectual force [when] used to compel a person
to’ [submit] . . . .”30 A 1995 Pennsylvania statute defined forcible
compulsion to include “[e]motional or psychological force, either
express or implied.”31
Progress was also made from a different direction: instead of
expanding “force” to include all forms of coercion, some reforms
achieved a similar result by requiring consent, and then requiring
that the necessary consent be “freely given” under all the
circumstances.32
In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States reflected the
older view when it held that the statute used to prosecute sex
trafficking—the law against holding any person in “involuntary
servitude”—applied only to traffickers who use physical or legal
26. M AC K INNON , T OWARD A F EMINIST T HEORY OF THE S TATE , supra note 22,
at 178.
27. Id. at 173, 175, 177–78.
28. Id.
29. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 404 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(Spaeth, J., dissenting) aff’d by equally divided court, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
30. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986).
31. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. Sp. Sess. No. 1 Act 1995-10 (S.B. 2).
32. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (1992).
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compulsion.33 Congress overruled that decision and specified that
coercion “[i]nclud[es] psychological, financial, or reputational
harm . . . sufficiently serious . . . to compel a reasonable person [to
submit] . . . .”34
We cannot necessarily draw a straight line from all these
reforms back to Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, but
nothing else was as important as Professor MacKinnon’s work in
severing the link between our understanding of rape and the
expectation that the crime inherently involves aberrant physical
brutality. Her writing shattered the myth that force must mean
physical violence. Nothing else was as important in opening
society’s eyes to the fact that many faces of force can compel
submission just as effectively as threats of violence.
So far, I have left out two important parts of this story. One
is pushback based on the argument that that women supposedly
should not be pampered or “infantilized”—that nothing stops a
woman from resisting a nonviolent sexual advance if she really
wants to resist.35 I will say more about that below. But first,
there was reform that came from the other side of the fence: the
feminists and victim advocates who did not really get the full
MacKinnon message—I am especially pointing to the slogan, “nomeans-no.”
I found myself under fire from some reform advocates in the
1990s when I criticized the no-means-no movement.36 Obviously
“no” must mean no. But pitching the argument that way does not
go very far and its emphasis is badly misplaced.
One thing Professor MacKinnon’s work makes clear is that
the no-means-no idea puts all the burden on the woman to speak
up, to resist, even when speaking up and resisting is exactly what
social constraints and disparate power make it difficult or
impossible for her to do.37

33. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 932 (1988).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4) (2012) (defining the serious harm that qualifies as
coercion within (e)(2)).
35. E.g., K ATIE R OIPHE , T HE M ORNING A FTER 67–68 (1993) (ridiculing the
notion, allegedly underlying feminist reforms, that women are “[w]eak-willed,
alabaster bodies, whose virtue must be protected from the cunning encroachments
of the outside world” and that law must protect “[t]he cowering woman, knocked on
her back by the barest feather of peer pressure”; insisting instead that “[t]he idea
that women can’t withstand verbal or emotional pressure infantilizes them.”).
36. See Rebecca Whisnant, Feminist Perspective on Rape, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-rape/.
37. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 H ARV . L. & P OL ’ Y R EV . 431,
446 (2016).
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Of course, some who supported the no-means-no slogan
understood that; they just wanted to make sure that —at a
minimum—a verbal protest would always be sufficient.38
Unfortunately, however, the no-means-no mantra distracted
attention from the main point, and reinforced the expectation that
an unwilling person would protest. Its subtext was—and still is—
that sexual aggressors are entitled to take for granted a woman’s
availability unless and until she clearly and explicitly objects. In
addition, some reform advocates even made that assumption
explicit. In arguing for no-means-no, one feminist reformer wrote
that “the jury has to believe that she did say ‘no’ . . . . Women
should not be overprotected.”39
My own work argues otherwise.40
For practical and
theoretical reasons, willingness should never be assumed.41
Arriving at the same conclusion from a somewhat different
starting point, Professor MacKinnon writes in Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State that “[t]he deeper problem is that women are
socialized to passive receptivity; [they] may have . . . no
alternative to [passive] acquiescence.”42
Therefore, silent
submission and actual willingness are not the same thing; one
should never be equated with the other.
That brings me to the current battle cry: “yes-means-yes.”43
Here, the problem is similar to the one we encountered with
respect to no-means-no: a well-intentioned, ostensibly progressive
rallying cry misleads and fosters assumptions that ultimately are
antithetical to effective reform.
The yes-means-yes slogan
impedes genuine clarity in society’s understanding of the stakes.
What the slogan is supposed to mean is that silence does not mean
yes.44
People have to give permission; that’s the essential
minimum. But again, the mantra, in this case “yes means yes,” is
drastically incomplete. It distracts attention from the main point

38. Vivian Berger, Rape Law Reform at the Millennium, 3 B UFF . C RIM . L. R EV .
513, 522 (2000).
39. Id.
40. S CHULHOFER , supra note 3, at 267–73; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11 L AW & P HIL . 35, 74–75 (1992).
41. S CHULHOFER , supra note 3, at 267–73; see also Schulhofer, Taking Sexual
Autonomy Seriously, supra note 40, at 74–75.
42. M AC K INNON , T OWARD A F EMINIST T HEORY OF THE S TATE , supra note 22,
at 177.
43. See MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 37, at 454–56 (describing the
“so-called affirmative consent standard, understood as meaning that only when a
woman says yes to sex is it not rape”).
44. Id.
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because it reinforces the expectation that “yes” does mean yes and
that a person who says “yes” is willing.
We must be clear about this: for all the reasons that
Professor MacKinnon shows, “yes” does not always mean yes. In
situations dominated by disparities of power, merely saying yes is
not saying that I have freely made a sexual choice.45
III. Where We Are Now
We therefore remain a long way from a proper social
understanding of the issues and the law’s role in addressing them.
But first, the good news. Two key points are mostly accepted.
They are, first, that “no” is always sufficient to establish nonconsent,46 and second, that force does not always have to be
physical force—other coercive circumstances suffice.47 To be clear,
even these basic points still are not universally accepted in United
States law. We are still fighting these two elementary battles.48
But for the most part, these battles have been won.
Now the status report moves into more disappointing
territory. It should be an equally basic point that non-consent—
for example, a clear “no”—is sufficient by itself to make
penetration a crime, even when there is no additional force of any
kind: physical, psychological, situational, or otherwise.
This simple proposition should not be the least bit
controversial.
Unlike the first two points, however, this
proposition is not close to being fully accepted in United States
law. In almost half the states, sexual penetration is not a crime

45. See S CHULHOFER , supra note 3, at 168–253 (discussing taints that result
from disparities of power and trust).
46. Compare State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 227 (Idaho 2013) (“[V]erbal
resistance is sufficient resistance to substantiate a charge of forcible rape.”), with
John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “NonConsent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1112 (2012) (providing an overview of how different
states understand the necessary level of resistance to establish non-consent).
47. M ODEL P ENAL C ODE , Preliminary Draft No. 5, supra note 4, at 45–47.
48. See generally Decker & Baroni, supra note 46 (discussing current gaps in
the law in this regard).
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unless there is both non-consent and some sort of force.49
Penetration without consent is not, in itself, a crime.50
This last point is emphasized for a reason; it is not a
misprint. All people (or almost all people) know, as a matter of
common decency, that no one is supposed to ignore a clear
expression of non-consent. Today many students learn in high
school, and nearly all college students learn in freshman
orientation, that it is unacceptable to ignore a clear expression of
non-consent.51 But that is not a criminal law requirement in
almost half the states. In all these jurisdictions, some sort of force
is required, in addition to non-consent, to make out a crime.52
I will come back to this legal approach in a moment, but I do
not want to dwell on it, because it has finally become the minority
view. In a majority of states, it is finally true that non-consent
alone suffices,53 and this is the recommendation currently before
the American Law Institute in its revision of the sexual offense
provisions of the Model Penal Code.54 This battle is not over, but
the trend is clear. The opposition is becoming weaker by the
minute.
That leaves two important issues where the trend is not clear
and where reform still faces formidable opposition. First, what
49. CAROL E. TRACY ET AL., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
19–20 (2013), http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/04-Meetings/sub-20150507/03_Rape_
SexAsslt_LegalSystem_WLP_AEQuitas_20120605.pdf (listing Alabama, the
District of Columbia, Kansas, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, and Washington as states that require both penetration without
consent and without force).
50. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (noting
that in Massachusetts, the offense “encompass[es] two separate elements each of
which
must
independently
be
satisfied . . . beyond
a
reasonable
doubt . . . (1) . . . physical force[,] . . . nonphysical, constructive force, . . . or threats
of bodily harm . . . and (2) at the time of penetration, there was no consent.”); see
also M ODEL P ENAL C ODE , Preliminary Draft No. 5, supra note 4, at 52–53
(“[Thirty-one] American jurisdictions impose [criminal] liability on the basis of
nonconsent alone, without requiring any added showing of force.”).
51. Tovia Smith, To Prevent Sexual Assault, Schools and Parents Start Lessons
Early, NPR (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:48 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/09/487497208/toprevent-sexual-assault-schools-and-parents-start-lessons-early; Beth Howard, How
Colleges are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 28, 2015,
2:58
PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-arebattling-sexual-violence.
52. See TRACY ET AL., supra note 49, at 19–20.
53. Id.
54. See M ODEL P ENAL C ODE : S EXUAL A SSAULT AND R ELATED O FFENSES at
23–41 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 5 2016). This “Council Draft,” also part of
the ongoing ALI revision project, has not been formally approved by the ALI and
does not represent its official position on any of matters covered.
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counts as consent? What is the minimum requirement? And
second, when that minimum requirement is met—for example,
when you have explicit permission—what circumstances nullify
that apparent consent? When does yes not mean yes? These are
the places where the key battles for reform are now being fought.
a. What counts as consent?
Even among states that treat absence of consent as sufficient
(together with sexual penetration) to establish the offense, there is
wide and consequential disagreement about what “consent”
means. There are three options in play. The first option says that
to prove unwillingness, there must be some verbal protest.55 The
second option says we should assume non-consent unless there is
clear affirmative permission. In the first option, silence and
passivity always imply consent; in the second option, silence and
passivity always mean no consent.56 In the third option, silence
and passivity can imply either consent or non-consent, depending
on all the circumstances.57
In media accounts, the requirement of affirmative permission
is often portrayed as a nightmare of fascist intervention in private
life, as if all sex would be illegal in the absence of a written
agreement—signed, sealed, and notarized.58 You would never
know from the alarmist media hype that realistic standards of
affirmative consent, signaled by words or conduct, are already the

55. E.g., N.Y. P ENAL L AW § 130.05(2)(d) (McKinney 2017) (requiring that “the
victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a
reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood such person’s
words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the
circumstances.”); N EB . R EV . S TAT § 28-318(8) (2016) (“Without consent
means . . . the victim expressed a lack of consent through words,
or . . . conduct . . . .”).
56. E.g., W IS . S TAT . § 940.225(4) (2016) (defining consent as “freely given
agreement”); State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992)
(requiring “affirmative and freely-given permission”).
57. E.g., M E . R EV . S TAT . A NN . tit. 17-A, § 255-A(1)(A) (2016) (requiring proof
that the victim “has not expressly or impliedly acquiesced”); M O . A NN . S TAT . §
566.061(14) (West 2017) (noting that consent “may be expressed or implied”);
McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571, 574 (Nev. 1992) (“Lack of protest by a victim is
simply one among the totality of circumstances to be considered by the trier of fact
[in determining whether there was a lack of consent].”).
58. See, e.g., Ashe Schow, Has the Federal Government Ever Had Sex?, W ASH .
E XAMINER (June 15, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/hasthe-federal-government-ever-had-sex/article/2565963 (“This new attempt to alter
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, a highly influential document that
has been adopted in whole or in part by many states’ legislatures, is part of a push
to bring authoritarianism into the bedroom.”).
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law in many states, including Minnesota and Wisconsin,59 where
these standards seem to work perfectly well.
Equally important, it is crucial to explain why this is the
right standard. This standard simply says that people do not want
to be sexually penetrated unless and until they indicate (by words
or actual conduct) that they do. Without that requirement, the
law would, in effect, be assuming that people are always receptive
to sexual intercourse (at any time, with any person) until they do
something to revoke that permission.
That is hardly an accurate description of ordinary life.
Moreover, when we consider the specific contexts in which sexual
abuse typically occurs, the point is even clearer.
Sexual
interaction too often occurs when someone’s ability to express
unwillingness is impaired, whether by fright, intimidation,
alcohol, or drugs. A standard that treats silence or passivity as
equivalent to consent—a standard that requires people to
communicate their unwillingness—presents enormous dangers of
sexual abuse.
b. What circumstances can nullify apparent consent?
The second arena where the major battles over reform are
now playing out is on the difficult question: when does yes not
mean yes? Obviously, “yes” is not authentic consent when it is
given at the barrel of a gun. The issue we are fighting over today
is the same one that has been unresolved since the 1960s: what
things other than physical violence make consent inauthentic?
Broadly speaking, the major disagreement on this issue is between
those who want the list to be very short—limited to things that are
almost as coercive as physical violence—and on the other side,
those who want that list to include many or all the other
circumstances that limit a completely free choice.
Before discussing the choice between grudging reform and
very ambitious reform, it is worth mentioning a more abstract but
nonetheless crucial issue of strategy. This is an issue that divides
those of us in that second group, those of us who agree about the
need to protect against a broad range of coercive pressures.
The issue here is the choice, familiar to law students and
legal academics, between clear rules and flexible standards:

59. M INN . S TAT . A NN . § 609.341(4)(a) (2016) (defining consent as “words or
overt actions by a person indicating a freely given present agreement to perform a
particular sexual act with the actor.”); W IS . S TAT . § 940.225(4) (2016) (defining
consent as “freely given agreement”).
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should reform aim for statutes that specify which pressures are
unacceptably coercive?
Or, should reform statutes prohibit
coercive pressure in broad, general terms, leaving it for the jury to
decide whether circumstances were too coercive in the context of
each particular case?
When you get into the details of legislative reform, this
becomes a decisive issue, and committed reformers have different
views, not only about which framework meets fairness
requirements but also which approach is ultimately better for
victims.
Professor MacKinnon and I have had a friendly disagreement
on this issue. She proposes that the legal formula for identifying
criminal conduct should be whether the sexual intrusion involved
either “[the] threat or use of force, fraud, coercion, [or] abduction,”
or also “the abuse of power, trust, or a position of dependency or
vulnerability.”60 The Model Penal Code provision I have been
drafting and working to get passed aims to identify in detail which
circumstances involve prohibited kinds of force, fraud, coercion,
exploitation, and vulnerability. This means, of course, that the
proposed MPC provision also identifies, by implication, the kinds
of force, fraud, coercion, exploitation, and vulnerability—pervasive
in any modern society—that do not suffice to establish criminal
liability.61
The advantage of the proposed MPC approach is that it sets
boundaries for the criminal law that are as clear and specific as
possible.62 On the downside, it is infinitely less concise than
Professor MacKinnon’s conceptually phrased alternative. Also,
arguably on the downside for the MPC proposal (or an advantage,
depending on your perspective), it would not reach various kinds
of coercion and exploitation that could sometimes be prosecuted
under Professor MacKinnon’s approach. Examples of coercion that
the MPC proposal would not prohibit, absent aggravating
circumstances, would include the implicit pressure that can arise,
even without direct or indirect threats, in interaction between a
supervisor and a subordinate at work, between a public defender
and the accused, between a wealthy older man and an
economically vulnerable young mother, or between a popular

60. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 37, at 474.
61. See M ODEL P ENAL C ODE : S EXUAL A SSAULT AND R ELATED O FFENSES ,
supra note 54, at 10–22, 42–80 (proposing sexual offenses based on specifically
defined circumstances involving force, fraud, coercion, and exploitation).
62. See id.
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athlete and an insecure student on campus.63 Indeed, Professor
MacKinnon argues that the MPC proposal’s elaborate structure of
rules and exceptions is “fundamentally beside the point.”64
Referring specifically to the MPC revision effort I lead, Professor
MacKinnon acerbically writes:
Scholars debate granular details of the traditional elements of
consent and force in sexual interactions in complex and
esoteric ways, fracturing consent into a dozen forms with as
many modifiers and force into multiple guises and levels,
seldom assessing these elements themselves in sex equality
terms . . . . If rape is less a question of unwanted sex than of
unequal sex, if equality not autonomy is its primary issue, if
internal psychology is less determinative of these criminal acts
than leveraged external conditions and gendered social
behaviors, the existing conceptual framework, together with
its lexicon of examples, has been fundamentally beside the
point all along.65

A far better approach, she argues, is to prohibit:
[A]ll the forms of force that someone, usually a man, deploys
to coerce sex on someone with less power than he has. This is
not only far more realistic in lived experience. It is also more
sensible, more humane, and more workable in legal practice.
Coercion, including circumstances of social coercion, tend
(with social hierarchies) to build upon and leave forensic
tracks in the real world that are subject to investigation,
observation, and evidence. There are uniforms, positions of
authority, traditions and triggers of dominance, well-worn
consequences that flow from refusal of the desires of the
dominant. Even the psychological dynamics of coercion are far
more externally observable in their referents than are those of
consent.66

The choice between these two approaches is very important
and by no means easy. As is often the case when it comes to
translating reform aspirations into concrete legal form, the devil is
in the details. The differences among reformers on this issue,
however, are much less important than the disagreement between
all of us on the reform side and the large group of people who want
to make sure that prohibited forms of coercion—regardless of
whether defined by clear rules or by flexible standards—are kept
within narrow bounds.

63. For detailed discussion of the potential abuses that can arise in these
situations and assessment of the competing sexual autonomy interest of every
individual to seek intimacy in mutually desired relationships, see S CHULHOFER ,
supra note 3, at 99–113, 168–253.
64. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 37, at 436.
65. Id. at 435–36.
66. Id. at 469.
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Instead of going more deeply into the weeds on those issues
here, I want to turn now to broader and more fundamental
problems that we reformers face in trying to achieve progress.
The most intractable problems we face involve trying to convince
the large body of citizens who resist efforts to move forward,
citizens who do not want criminal sanctions in this area to reach
even one millimeter further than they already do.
IV. Resistance to Reform
I will use three greatly oversimplified categories to describe
groups that resist almost any reform of a relatively ambitious
nature. I will call them the misogynists, the low-information
opponents, and the well-informed, very thoughtful opponents.
Those that I call misogynists are those who do not make it a
priority to assure the dignity and equal worth of people who
happen to be women. They may not even consider the condition of
women in our society as a particularly pressing problem. They
simply do not see that women are disadvantaged, or they take
male privilege for granted. I am not going to say anything further
here about this group. Unlike some reformers whom I respect, I
do not see people in this group as hopelessly beyond persuasion.
We can and must think about ways to communicate with this
group and enlighten them. But this is not the place to pursue that
issue.
I want to focus here on the two groups of well-intentioned
opponents: those whose views are shaped by low-information and
those whose opposition springs from sophisticated concerns.
These last two groups pose a larger challenge because they hold
the balance of power in settings where reform efforts play out.
These are the groups that we must understand and connect with if
we want to make progress.
The low-information group includes people who have decent
values but a distorted picture of what rape cases really involve.
They think they understand the problems, because they have seen
TV shows about sexual assault on campus; they have heard TV
pundits debating both sides of the issues in those cases; they may
even have read newspaper op-eds discussing the pros and cons on
the subject.
I wish someone would study the amount of time and space
that TV and the newspapers devote to campus sexual assault,
especially cases involving upper middle-class, mostly White
defendants, and then compare it to the time and space devoted to
all other situations involving sexual abuse. I do not know what
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the numbers would show, but I do know that when my work on
legislative reform runs into resistance, it comes far too often from
people in policy-making authority who want to know how my
proposals would apply to their own son or daughter who just
started college. That is a perfectly reasonable question for any
parent to ask.
But lawyers, judges, legislators and others
weighing the merits of public policy surely can be expected to
consider the problem through a wider lens. Yet ninety percent of
the time, resistance to reform seems to come from decision-making
elites who picture the typical rape scenario as a case involving two
college classmates at a party, flirting, drinking too much,
experimenting sexually, and not communicating with each other
very well.
Of course, rape-victim advocates vigorously challenge this
picture of campus life by stressing how much deliberately
predatory behavior occurs between classmates in college
settings.67 Unfortunately, that kind of challenge inadvertently
perpetuates the idea that the central problem our society faces
today in connection with sexual abuse is the problem of too much
drinking, too little communication, and too much boorish behavior
on college campuses. This pervasive assumption is dangerously
misleading; it can almost be described as a myth. My claim in this
regard may seem counter-intuitive, and it is important not to
misunderstand it. Sexual assault on campus is a very serious
problem. Reform efforts must give it a great deal of attention, and
it is a big part of my own work.68
But focusing on these campus scenarios gives people—both
those committed to reform and those who oppose it—a distorted
picture of sexual abuse in the United States today. The situations
in which the serious inadequacies in current rape law become
most salient and consequential include domestic violence,
physically and mentally disabled victims, and gross discrepancies
in age, power, or authority. The salient abuses also include
intoxication, of course, but not only intoxication involving middleclass college students. Equally important are cases of intoxication
67. See, e.g., Brigid Schulte, One in 5 Girls will be Sexually Assaulted in
College. Here’s How to Help Change That, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/local/wp/2014/12/03/one-in-five-girls-will-beraped-in-college-eight-steps-parents-can-take-to-change-that/?utm_term=.298bb0
aa0275 (discussing the effects of campus sexual assault training focusing on
identifying “predatory behavior”).
68. See, e.g., SANFORD H. K ADISH , S TEPHEN J. S CHULHOFER & R ACHEL E.
B ARKOW , C RIMINAL L AW AND I TS P ROCESSES 354–55, 403–05 (10th ed. 2017);
S CHULHOFER , supra note 3, at 7–9, 14–15, 261–73.
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in settings framed by poverty, domestic violence, and social
deprivation of all kinds.69
So, building a consensus for reform requires changing the
narrative. We must work to shake people free of the media’s
obsession with young, inexperienced, middle-class peers in college
settings.
We have thousands, probably millions of wellintentioned citizens, people of good will and good values, who are
stuck in the media narratives about naïve, inexperienced kids
behaving badly.
These low-information people have to be
reminded of the wide range of very different contexts in which
current rape law fails. They must be made aware of what the rape
reform effort is really about.
The third group, the last source of resistance I want to
discuss, is the hardest.
These are well informed, highly
sophisticated people with decent values. They are intensely
concerned about the injustice to defendants that pervades our
entire criminal justice system: abuses of prosecutorial discretion;
shocking racial disparities; intense leverage deployed to coerce
guilty pleas, especially when the evidence is the weakest; overly
punitive sentencing; mass incarceration; and by no means least,
our overly rigid, vastly over-inclusive system of sex-offender
registration.
This system often includes absurd, life-long
restrictions on the offender’s residency, education, and
employment, applied to offenders whose crimes, though serious to
be sure, do not mark them with the potential for life-long violent
recidivism.70
One answer to all these concerns is that there are vast
numbers of conscientious, dedicated police, prosecutors, and
judges who work hard every day to make responsible judgments
and pursue justice fairly and even-handedly, without overreacting
to less egregious behavior. Another answer is that in rape cases
the failures of our criminal justice system usually lean in the
69. PA. COAL. AGAINST RAPE, POVERTY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 71–84 (2007),
http://www.pcar.org/sites/default/files/pages-pdf/poverty_and_sexual_violence.pdf
(discussing the relationship between sexual violence and a number of factors such
as age, homelessness, employment, and poverty generally).
70. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM
IN
MINNESOTA 2–3 (2007), http://www.csom.org/pubs/MN%20Residence%20
Restrictions_04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity%20MN.pdf (“Not one of the 224
sex offenses would likely have been deterred by a residency restrictions law . . . . A
statewide residency restrictions law would likely have, at best, only a marginal
effect on sexual recidivism.”); see also Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws
and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412
(2010) (arguing that the current restrictions on sexual offenders might not achieve
the goals they are meant to).
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opposite direction: police and prosecutors who will not pursue
meritorious cases, juries that will not return justified convictions,
and outrageously lenient sentencing, especially in cases involving
middle-class, White defendants.71
For many of the victim advocates I work with, those answers
are more than sufficient. Many of them cannot imagine that it is
in any way plausible to think of rape law as an area where our
criminal justice system is too harsh or too discriminatory. I wish I
could fully agree with the victim advocates who hold that view,
because it would make my job and my own commitments to reform
much easier and much less conflicted. I can certainly match every
claim about unfairness to defendants with a dozen stories that
demonstrate the opposite. When I’m being honest with myself,
however, and when I am trying to reach people of good will who do
worry about racial discrimination, people who do worry about sexoffender registration and harsh, inflexible punishments, I must
acknowledge that there is no simple answer to their concerns.
Both pictures have a lot of disturbing truth. There is
pervasive under-reporting and under-enforcement, pervasive
unwillingness to credit well-founded victim complaints, and
pervasive inadequacy of punishment in prosecutions that lead to
conviction.72 All that is true. Those problems exist to an alarming
degree.
But victim advocates must be equally willing to
acknowledge the opposing dynamic that exists side-by-side with
that neglect: pervasive race bias and class bias in enforcement;
pervasive abuse of charging power and plea bargaining; pervasive
rigidity and disproportionality in punishment; pervasive
overbreadth, overreaction, and inflexibility in the deployment of
collateral consequences such as registration, community
notification, and restrictions on public benefits, employment, and
residency.73
The vexing problem we reformers face in trying to craft a
more protective law of sexual assault is resistance from decent
71. See, e.g., Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape
Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-dueling-statements-of-victimand-attackers-father.html?_r=0 (discussing the role of privilege in sexual assault
sentencing and convictions).
72. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT 36–39, 42 (Candace Kruttschnitt et al. eds., 2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK202264/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK202264.pdf.
73. See, e.g., CASSIA C. SPOHN ET AL., PROSECUTORS’ CHARGING DECISIONS IN
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 3 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/197048.pdf (discussing the effects of race and class on
prosecution decisions).
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people who are well aware of un-redressed victimization but at the
same time are acutely aware of extreme racial disparities and the
wildly inconsistent responses our media and our society have to
sexual abuse: extreme skepticism toward victim allegations on the
one hand and on the other, almost simultaneously, indiscriminate,
extremely harsh condemnation and punishment when someone is
alleged to be or found to be an offender.
The challenge for successful reform is to find ways we can
maintain and strengthen our commitment to fair and
proportionate punishment while also giving victims the much
more effective protection they need from male aggression and all
the other forms of exploitation and sexual overreaching that are
still so pervasive in the United States today.

